Panopulos v. Maderis [DISSENT] by Carter, Jesse W.
Golden Gate University School of Law
GGU Law Digital Commons
Jesse Carter Opinions The Jesse Carter Collection
11-21-1956
Panopulos v. Maderis [DISSENT]
Jesse W. Carter
Supreme Court of California
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions
Part of the Torts Commons
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Jesse Carter Collection at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Jesse Carter Opinions by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carter, Jesse W., "Panopulos v. Maderis [DISSENT]" (1956). Jesse Carter Opinions. Paper 121.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions/121
Nov. PANOPULOS v. MADERIS 337 
[47 337; 
F. No. 19514. In 
AMELIA 
F. No. 19515. 
CATHERINE 
F. No. 19516. In Bank. 
BEATRICE 
[S. ]'.No. 19517. In Bank. Nov. 
ELIZABETH HODENSON, v. GUSSIE 
MADERIS, 
(1] Automobiles-Care as to Guests-Statutory Limitation.-The 
guest law as incorporated in Veh. Code, § is a limitation 
on the liability of a vehicle driver in cases the rules of 
ordinary negligence would otherwise apply. 
(2] Appeal- Objections- Adherence to of Case.-Gen-
erally, a party to an action may for the first time on 
appeal, change the theory of the cause especially 
when the theory controverted ques-
tions of fact or mixed of law and fact. 
[3] !d.-Objections-Adherence to Theory of Case.-If a question 
of law only is presented on facts in the record a 
change in theory may be permitted on appeal, but if the new 
theory contemplates a factual the of 
which are open to controversy and were not put 
presented at the trial, the opposing party should 
quired to defend against it on appeal. 
[4] Automobiles- Care as to Guests- Status of Defendant as 
Driver.-It may not properly be said that the manually 
directing the operation of an automobile in course of mak-
ing a trip would, under all circumstances and a matter of 
law, lose his status as driver Veh. Code, 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Auto-
mobiles, § 237 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10] § 123(1); 
[2, 3, 6] Appeal and Error, § 119; Automobiles, § la. 
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§ because he vacates the driver's 
seat and is out of the car at the time of an accident. 
[5] Id.-Care as to Guests-Status of Defendant as Driver.-
Whether the person manually directing the operation of an 
automobile is or is not the driver of the car at the time of an 
accident depends on the facts of each case, and a 
ing to avoid under Veh. § the 
by establishing his status driver should have the 
present evidence on the at the trial in response to 
appropriate allegations and proof and have the 
passed on by the under instructions. 
[6] Appeal-Objections-Adherence to Theory of Case.-When the 
facts with reference to a contention made on appeal 
appear to be undisputed and probably no different showing 
could be made on a new trial, it is appropriate for the appellate 
court to entertain the contention as a question of law. 
[7] Automobiles- Care as to Guests- Existence of Host-guest 
Relationship.-A person in an automobile cannot be a guest 
except in relationship to another, namely, the driver as con-
templated by Veh. Code, § 403, the guest law. 
[8] Id.-Definitions-"Driver."-Though Veh. Code, § 69, defines 
"driver" to be one "who drives" as distinguished from one 
"who is driving," one who is driving is also a driver and falls 
within the category of those who are "in actual physical con-
trol of the vehicle," and since the statute contemplates both 
as drivers it must be assumed that the Legislature intended 
that one not at a particular moment in actual control of a 
vehicle may also be deemed to be a driver. 
[9] Id.-Care as to Guests-Status of Defendant as Driver.-The 
legislative intent to broaden the application of Veh. Code, 
§ 403, the guest law, by amendment so as to include situations 
where the vehicle was not "moving'' and the guest was not 
"riding" would not make it imperative that the driver be 
actually at the wheel at the time of an accident. 
[10] Id.-Care as to Guests-Existence of Host-guest Relationship. 
-In a case where a vehicle driver steps out and a guest re-
mains in the vehicle, the guest still occupies the host's prop-
erty, enjoys his hospitality and continues in the relationship 
contemplated by Veh. Code, § 403, the guest law. 
APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of Santa 
Clara County. John D. Foley, Judge. Affirmed. 
Actions for damages for personal injuries arising out of an 
automobile accident. Judgments for defendant affirmed. 
p ANOPUWS MADERIS 339 
C.2d 337; 303 P .2d 738] 
,James F. Boccardo and Edward ,J. Niland .for .Appellants. 
Custer, ·warburton & 
and W. R. Dunn .for lH~snonnen 
Frank L. Custer 
Hodenson 
are the plaintiffs .Amelia 
Beatrice Schunke and Elizabeth 
on verdicts .for the defendant 
Gussie Maderis in .four separate actions for personal injuries 
out o.f an automobile accident which occurred while 
were in the defendant's automobile. 
'l'he causes were consolidated and tried together. 
'fhe plaintiffs and another lady accompanied the defendant 
in her automobile .from San Jose to Mountain View where 
they attended a public card party, as they had done on other 
occasions. On the return trip Mrs. Fitts sat in the front 
seat next to the defendant who was in the driver's position, 
and Mrs. Schunke sat on the extreme right of the front 
seat. 'fhe other three ladies sat in the back. Upon arriving 
in San Jose the defendant stopped her automobile in front 
of Mrs. Fitts' home on level ground, stepped out of the car 
and stood at the side thereof. The automobile was equipped 
with automatic transmission and the defendant left the shift 
lever in neutral position with the motor running. :B'rom the 
neutral position very little force was required to move the 
gear shift lever to drive or low positions, whereas had it 
been left in the park position it would have been first neces-
sary to lift the lever before changing its position. In the 
park position the rear wheels would be locked and the car 
could not be moved without skidding. From either the low 
or drive, but not in neutral position the automobile would 
proceed forward if the speed of the motor was advanced 
beyond the idling speed, except when the emergency brake 
was properly engaged. 
After alighting the defendant invited Mrs. Pitts to leave 
the car on the driver's side. This she proceeded to do. She 
was elderly and infirm and had never driven an automobile. 
In attempting to slide across the seat she apparently caused 
the gear shift lever to be moved to either the low or drive 
position and touched the accelerator, although there is no 
direct evidence to that effect. The car went forward, jumped 
a curb and crashed against a wall some 300 feet from where 
the defendant alighted. .All four plaintiffs were injured. 
The evidence was conflicting as to whether the plaintiffs 
[47 C.2d 
vehide .. 
injury to or the death of 
unless the plaintiff in any such 
action establishes that such or death proximately re-
sulted from intoxieation or wilful miseonduet of said 
driver." 
At the trial the 
of section 403 
to show the inapplicability 
that they were paying 
defendant driver. The de-
u.Jxmxu in that and in response to a special 
the jury found that the plaintiffs were guests 
passengers. That flnding is supported by sub-
stantial evidence and there is no eontcntion to the contrary. 
It thus established the relationship contemplated by the statute 
and on the on which the causes were tried foreclosed 
liability on the of the defendant. 'l'here was no evidence 
of intoxication or wilful misconduct. 
'l'he well be afflrmed on the theory on 
which causes ·were tried without further discussion were 
it not for another advanced by the plaintiffs for the 
first time on appeal to the effect that section 403 is not 
...,U,AkCH~ to the facts of this case for another and independent 
The now contend that section 403 is not 
as a matter of law, the defendant was 
not the "driver" of the vehicle at the time of the accident 
section 403. 
asserts that where a cause has 
in by the parties, an appel-
a reversal on an entirely new theory. (See 
Durkee v. Land & Water 151 Cal. 561, 569 [91 
P. 389] ; Merrill 29 Cal.App. 382, 386 [155 
P. . ) It is rule that a party to an action 
may not, for first time on appeal, change the theory of 
the cause of action. (Ernst v. Searle, 218 Cal. 233, 240 [22 
777 f:3~ P.2d ; Shumate 
Ca LA pp.2<l 121, 130 
114 Ca1.App.2d GS 
properly he said that 
operation of an aniomobilc 
therein \YOI!ld, under all 
law, lose his stains 
by section 40:3 
is out of the ear at 
lw is or is not i hr dri wr of tlw 
~woul(l seem to depend on the 
e1·ent the to ;woirl liabil 
status as the rlriver shouM hnYl' t 
on tlH' the trial in 
tions and proof and have the 
jury undrr· a ppropriatr: 
[6] However, when as lwre the faets 
contention newly made 011 
and that Jn·obahl.\· llO 
a new trial it is c1rrnH:\l 
tention as a 
on it aecordingly. 
The >Yllrf1H•r "''<"l 
hm;t. (lrivPr is outsi<le of tlw 
accident is clrrinwrl to be n 
is not the easr. ln Pnm 
81:3 [ 107 P .2<1 G24l. ii 
a ride the plaintiff was a t:·w•,;:f. 
temporarily left thr mdomnbile on ,;t 
remained in ihe ear. T': roll,•J down thr 
was injnrPd. 'l'lw eonrt lw111 tl1at wherP 
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a demurrer without leave to 
sustained. 'rhe discussed in 
~,. ..... ~~ was whether the continued to 
exist while the driver was outside of the 
automobile. The court concluded that vvas a 
the same if the in a moment 
had rolled down the 
street .... As person, without compen-
sation to the has entered a ear upon the invitation 
of such driver and remains 'in the vehicle upon a 
'during such ride' ( § he is a and cannot recover 
damages for the simple negligenee of the host.'' The plaintiffs 
here attempt to distinguish that case on the ground that the 
only point discussed by the court was the status of the 
plaintiff as a guest. The eourt did not discuss the status of 
the defendant as a driver at the moment of injury. [7] But 
obviously one cannot be a guest exeept in relationship to 
another, namely, the driver as contemplated section 403. 
It is apparent that the court in the Frankenstein ease, in 
determining that section 403 was applicable, deemed it neces-
sary to conclude only that the plaintiff continued in the guest 
status while the defendant absented himself from the auto-
mobile. The ease properly held that the relationship between 
the parties of driver and guest satisfied the requirements of 
section 403. On its facts it cannot be distinguished in theory 
from the present case. (See also Castle v. McKeown, 327 
Mich. 518 [ 42 N.W.2d . ) 
The plaintiffs would require that the defendant be actually 
driving the automobile or be "in a position to drive" in 
order to become or remain within the provisions of the statute. 
They rely on section 69 of the V chicle Code which provides 
that a" 'Driyer' is a person who drives or is in actual physi-
cal control of a vehicle.'' The language of that section is 
not helpful. It is significant that the statute defines driYer 
to be one "who drives" as distinguished from one "who is 
driving.'' [8] One who is driving of eourse, also a driver 
and falls within the category of those who are ''in aetual 
physical control of a vehidc." Sinee the statute contemplates 
both as drivers it must be assnmecl that the Legislature in-
tended that one not at a particular moment in actual control 
of a vehicle may also be deemed to be a driver. Prager 
v. Isreal, 15 Ca1.2cl 89, 93 P .2r1 . ) Other code pro-
visions impose on a driver the duty of furnishing aiel and 
information when a vehicle is involved in an accident im-
343 
that the driver 
Code, 482, 
595 of the same code provides that "No 
in control or in charge of, a motor 
stand on any highway unattended 
"~ithout first the brakes thereon and stop-
the motor thereof." It is the defendant that 
she could not contend that she had not violated 
that section because she was outside of the ear when the 
brakes were not set and the motor left running. Attention 
has been called to the fact that in some jurisdictions it is 
made a offense for the driver of an automobile to leave 
the ignition key in place when the car is unattended. It is 
argned that it would be futile for the person responsible 
for such a condition to resist prosecution because he was 
outside of the car when cited for violation and therefore 
was not the driver as contemplated by law. It is asserted 
by the defendant that the present situation is in legal effect 
the same as those above referred to and that by a parity of 
reasoning she is entitled to the status of a driver within 
the meaning of seetion 403. ·without deciding the effect of 
other laws under the circumstances stated, references thereto 
appear to be pertinent. 
Prior to 1935 the contention that section 403 did not apply 
to the driver who had temporarily left the automobile could 
have reasonably been advanced. The statute then provided 
that a guest must have accepted a ride in a vehiele "moving 
upon any of the public highways'' and that he must have 
been injured "while so riding as such guest." ( Stats. 1929, 
ch. 787, § 1, p. 1580.) An amendment in 1935 eontains the 
present language. The Legislature there substituted the 
"in any vehicle upon a high~way" for "moving upon 
any of the public highways," and "during such ride" for 
"·while so riding." The significance of the amendment cannot 
be disregarded. [9] The legislative intent to broaden the 
application of the section (see Prager v. Isreal, sttpra, 15 
Cal.2d 89, 94) to include situations where the Yehicle was 
not "moving" and the guest was not "riding" would not 
make it imperative that the driver be actually at the wheel 
at the time of the accident. In commenting on the amend-
ment, the court in Smith v. Pope, 53 Cal.App.2d 43 [127 
P.2d 292], stated at page 47: ''In other words, it was not 
necessary, as it was before under the former section, to 
show that the vehicle vvas 'moving upon any highway,' but 
0.2d 
ride' 
time elapsed 
while so con-
's end. This con-
Frankenstein v. House . ... " 
is to be distinguished 
left the vehicle. 
at page 167 [293 
'~ovrnN cases that ''This consistent 
rule that the protection of the 
suffered 'during the ride' 
remained in or upon 
the accident. After the guest steps 
he enters into a pedestrian or other 
occupies the host's property 
. '' [10] But in a case where the 
and the remains in the vehicle the 
the host's enjoys his hospitality 
and continues in the contemplated by section 
403. It is obvious that the limitation on liability provided for 
therein relates to those acts of ordinary negligence performed 
to that (Ruel v. Langelier, 299 Mass. 
240 [12 N.E.2d 
It is concluded the record supports the judgments 
on the on ·which the causes were tried, and also that 
the contention first made the plaintiffs on appeal that 
the defendant \Yas not the driver of the car at the time of 
without merit. 
The affirmed. 
the record. Other conten-
in support of their 
and are deemed to be 
J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and 
section 403, the California 
to a situation where the person 
the automobile was outside of the 
the accident causing the injury occurred, 
has concluded that the term "driver," as used 
in the code something more than one 
actually in control of a vehicle. In support of this conclusion, 
345 
Honse, 
con-
resultant incrpase m accidents there-
enacted a 
recovery for ordinary negli-
the hospitality of the 
23 Cal.2d 237, 242 [143 
Because the section the plaintiff of his 
common law action his driver-host, it has been held 
repeatedly that the section must be strictly construed. In 
Prager v. Isreal, 15 Ca1.2d 93 [98 P.2d 729], we stated 
that: "It is well settled in this and other states that the 
so-called 'guest laws' are in derogation of the common law 
and must be construed strictly. (See McCann v. Hoffman, 
9 Cal.2d 279. 282 [70 P.2d 909] ; Callet v. Alioto, 210 CaL 65 
[290 P. ; Rocha v. Hulen, 6 Cal.App.2d 245, 254 f 44 
P.2d ; Iltmter v. Baldtt•in, 268 Mich. 106 [255 N.W. 431].) 
Furthermore, as stated in Rocha v. supm, 'The com-
mon law right of having redress for injuries wrongfully 
inflicted, being lessened by such statutes, necessitates strict 
construction, and also that cases be not held within the provi-
sions of Stlch statutes unless it clearly appears that it should 
be so determined.' (Emphasis ours.)" 
In this light, then, the question here is whether the term 
''driver'' is to be interpreted as denoting one who is actually 
operating or in a position to operate a motor vehicle, or, 
as the majority has concluded, as meaning- anyone who is 
eapable of operating a vehicle regardless of where he may 
be at the time in question. The portions of section 
403 read: "No rwrson who as a a ride ... has 
any right of action ... 
... on aceount 
such ride. . . . '' 
words, it cannot 
. .. such guest during 
Aceorcling to the plain import of these 
be said that the defendant, after leaving 
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the automobile 
Yet the 
to Vehicle sections 69 "driver" as one "who 
actual control of a vehicle"), 482, 
483, 484 a duty under criminal sanctions upon 
a driver invohed in an accident to furnish aid and informa-
and 595 the of unattended vehieles 
without the brakes and the motor but not 
the term "driver"). These sections are of doubtful 
assistance here in view of the strict construction to which 
section 403 is subject. an examination of the sec-
tions does not lead to the conclusion that the 
term "driver" was intended to include one not actually 
driving or in a position to drive the vehicle. 
In one sense, of course, anyone who has learned to operate 
a motor vehicle might be called a ''driver.'' By the same 
token, anyone to whom the hospitality of another is extended 
is a "guest" of the other. However, this broad meaning 
of the term "guest" is not employed in determining the ap-
plication of section 403, for as this court recently held in 
Boyd v. Cress, 46 Cal.2d 164 [293 P.2d 37], one is not a 
''guest'' within the purview of the section unless he is in or 
upon the vehicle at the time of the accident. That the con-
verse is true, that is, that one is not a ''driver'' within the 
purview of the section unless he is operating the vehicle, 
is indicated in the case of Y!tekett V. railthorpe, 207 Iowa 
613 [223 N.W. 254]. Interpreting a statute similar to sec-
tion 403, the Iowa Supreme Court said: "Manifestly, Section 
5026-b1, supra, contemplates a person on such journey in a 
motor vehicle, driven ot· 01Jeratccl by some one [emphasis 
added] .... Entrance must be made into an automobile then 
in the operation of a driver, so that a journey can be taken. 
The1·e can be no trip withmtt a driver. [Emphasis added.] 
Thus a person in such motor car without a driver operating 
it is not a passenger, within the meaning of the section under 
consideration; for, in the absenee of the necessary operator, 
there can be no journey, and consequently no riding. With-
out the driver, the journey, and the riding, there is no pas-
senger, in the case at bar. If then, under the provisions of 
the statute in question, there is no driver, there can be no 
passenger." (Emphasis added.) 
It is clear that the court interpreted "driYer" as meaning 
one actually operating the automobile. By analogy, this in-
terpretation is in accord with the California cases which have 
for the position 
here for the court in that relied 
, 111 Conn. 88 [149 A. 
:302 Mass. 273 [ l!J N.E.2d ) 
conclusion tlJCre reached. Both 
behind the steering wheel, which was 
not the case in Prankcnslcin v. IIottsc or here. Moreover, 
in the Head case, ·which was decided in J\Tassachusetts which 
has no guest statute but which restricts a guest's recovery 
under its common law (R1tel v. Langelier, 29~) Mass. 240, 243 
[12 N.E.2d 735] ) , the guest was not yet in the vehiele when 
the mishap occurred, a situation in which section 403 ·would 
elearly not in California (Boyd v. Cress, snpra.) 
'I'he reasoning advanced in the majority opinion that the 
1985 amendment of section 408 precludes the necessity of 
the driver being at the vYheel is not borne out by the opinion 
of this court in the Boyd case. There, a unanimous court, 
speaking through Mr. Justice Shenk, said ( 46 Cal.2d at p. 
167) : "The defendant eonstrues the 1935 amendment as 
extending the guest statute to injuries occurring during or 
incidental to the 'journey,' notwithstanding that the plaintiff 
is entirely outside of the automobile when the injury is 
sustained. But this construction would involve the reading 
of new and different language into the statute.'' If the 1935 
amendment leaves intact the requirement that the guest be 
in the vehicle, it like·wise leaves intact the requirement enun-
eiated in Puckett v. Pailthorpe, snpra, that there be a driver 
in control of the vehicle. To hold otherwise is to read "new 
and different language into the statute." 
Clearly then, as section 403, in restricting a guest's cause 
of action arising ''during such ride,'' requires that the guest 
be in the vehicle, consistent interpretation of the section 
demands that there also be a driver in the vehicle, for without 
a rider and a driver, there can be no ''ride.'' For this reason, 
I would reverse the judgment. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was (1enied December 
] 9, ] 95fi. Carter, .J., was of the opinion that the petition 
shouhl be granted. 
